Abstract
Summary
The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is often described as intractable. Japan is in possession by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Peace Treaty) and the Okinawa Reversion Treaty (Reversion Treaty). 1 China denies the opposability of these treaties for it was not a party to them. China claims a right to possession based on historic title. The question is whether Japan's possession has a legal basis that is opposable to China. Most articles focus on historic titles and ancient maps. However, international tribunals disregard claims to historic title that are not supported by evidence of the exercise of territorial sovereignty by the original title holder. They disregard ancient maps that are not an integral part of an agreement. This article applies an alternative approach that relies on the status quo post bellum (status quo). The status quo is the relative legal position of the parties at the end of armed hostilities and the starting point of their future international relations. It is a useful tool for resolving territorial disputes. In Award of the Arbitral Tribunal (Eritrea v. Yemen) and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) , the status quo that prevailed at the end of armed hostilities precluded reversion to ancient title over disputed territory. 2 In Dispute Concerning the Beagle Channel (Argentina v. Chile) and Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Benin/ Niger), territorial disputes among former colonies were resolved based on uti posseditis, which the jurists equated to status quo post bellum. 3 More importantly, in various instruments, China, Japan and the Allied powers outlined the status quo in the East China Sea to guide them in the future disposition of the islands after World War II. i. Japan caused the substitution of the term 'Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude' in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with the term 'Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude', thereby extending the area under its residual sovereignty to include the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. ii. The Allied powers recognized that the islands pertain to Nansei Shoto; that Japan has residual sovereignty over them and that China has no claim to them. iii. The Republic of China (ROC) did not object to the foregoing conduct of Japan and the Allied powers. Rather, it performed acts accepting the status accorded to the islands. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also did not object to the foregoing conduct of Japan and the Allied powers despite the opportunity to do so.
In sum, during the period 1945-1952, there was consensus that the islands were part of Nansie Shoto over which Japan has residual sovereignty and to which China has no claim. It is said that consensus is not enough basis to resolve territorial disputes. In Eritrea v. Yemen and Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh (Malaysia/Singapore), title was awarded based on a 'general opinion' and a 'convergent evolution of … positions [on territorial title]' as confirmed by the positive acts of the parties, there being no clear and convincing evidence of a subsisting title. 5 In this article, it is shown that the consensus on the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was not at odds with any prior existing title, and it was confirmed by the conduct of the parties after 1945-1952 and before the critical date of 1970.
Japan
16 surfaced. The critical date was 16 September 1970 when ROC Ambassador Chou Shu Kai sent an aide-memoire to US Assistant Secretary Marshal Green protesting Japanese presence in the area. 17 Meanwhile, the USA and Japan signed the Reversion Treaty, 18 which provided for the relinquishment to Japan of the rights to an area of the Nansei Shoto that were granted to the USA under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. 19 The area includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, situated at 25°45′ N, 123°E. 20 The USA emphasized that the rights that it had assumed from Japan under the Peace Treaty were the same rights that it restored to Japan under the Reversion Treaty -it did not add to the rights and interests of Japan nor diminish those of China. One of the terms of the Cairo Declaration was the restoration of 'all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as … Formosa … to the [ROC]'. 37 It is clear that under the foregoing instruments, China, Japan and the Allied powers outlined the status quo in the East China Sea to serve as a frame of reference for the future disposition of the islands in the area. The natural starting point for resolving the conflicting claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would be to determine their status quo. There is no mention of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in any of the instruments. There is no mention also in the Peace Treaty, which merely declares Japan's renunciation of rights to Formosa 38 and the relinquishment of administration over Nansei Shoto. 39 The status quo of the islands would have to be ascertained from primary records of the conduct of China, Japan and the Allied powers in negotiating, interpreting and applying the instruments during the period 1945-1952. This article undertakes the task in five parts, including the summary and this introduction.
The third part of the article discusses the concept of status quo post bellum. According to this concept, the termination of war through the simple cessation of armed hostilities signifies a tacit recognition by the parties that their relative legal positions form the reference point of their future international relations. China, Japan and the Allied powers did abide by this concept in the various instruments and in their post-war conduct. The fourth part examines the primary records to determine the status quo of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after the war. The focus is not on historic title or ancient maps, which generally have not been dispositive of territorial disputes. However, the conduct of the parties in the periods proximate to 1945-1952 is also considered since it might indicate the existence of a 'convincing alternative title' or confirm the status quo. 40 The tribunal in Eritrea v. Yemen awarded title of the Mohabbakahs to Eritrea based on the presumption in the Lausanne Treaty that at the end of the war all islands within the territorial sea of a coastal state belong to that state. 41 The presumption in favour of Eritrea prevailed because Yemen did not produce a 'convincing alternative title' to the islands.
Based on the discussion in the fourth part of the article, the fifth part responds to the question raised at the outset on the opposability of the legal basis of Japan's possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It reaches the conclusion that upon cessation of armed hostilities, there was consensus among China, Japan and the Allied powers that the islands are part of Nansei Shoto over which Japan had residual sovereignty and that China had no claim to them. This consensus is confirmed by the subsequent conduct of the parties.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that it is possible to resolve the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands based on international law. Although China did not consent to the Peace Treaty or the Reversion Treaty, its relations with Japan in regard to the islands are governed by the consensus underlying the status quo post bellum and confirmed by their subsequent conduct. This approach is discussed in the following section. 38 Peace Treaty, supra note 1, Art. 2. 39 Ibid., Art. 3. 40 See Eritrea v. Yemen, supra note 2, at 472. 41 Ibid. Note that the Mohabakkahs are within 12 nautical miles from the Eritrean coast. When the 1923 Lausanne Treaty adopted the presumption that islands within the territorial sea of a coastal state should belong to that state, the prevailing practice was the three-nautical-mile territorial sea. Nonetheless, the tribunal applied the presumption because in 1953 Eritrea enacted a law declaring a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.
Alternative Approach Based on the Status Quo Post Bellum
The approach adopted in this article is to determine consensus on the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1945-1952 and to verify whether factors proximate to that period contradict or confirm it. The first section discusses why this alternative approach is preferred over the approach applied in most articles, which is to rely solely on historic titles and ancient maps. The second section explains that this alternative approach is subscribed to by China, Japan and the Allied powers in regard to the islands in the East China Sea.
A Historic Titles and Ancient Maps
Most articles dealing with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands focus on which state -China or Japan -has the longer historic title 42 or older map. 43 They assess Japan's claim based on evidence of the incorporation of the islands into the Okinawa prefecture in 1894 44 compared to China's claim based on the following evidence: (i) ancient literature that refers to the islands by name; 45 (ii) records of voyages in which imperial envoys of the Ming and Qing Courts to the Ryukyu Tributary described the islands; 46 (iii) records of the Ryukyu Kingdom that the islands are outside its boundary as compared to records of the Qing dynasty that the islands are within China's boundaries 47 and (iv) Chinese and foreign maps from the 14th century to the 19th century indicating that the islands were under the coastal defence of the Ming and Qing courts. 48 There are presently well-defined standards to test claims to historic title. In Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Malaysia based its claim to historic title to Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan on the tribal allegiance bestowed upon the Sultan of Sulu by the fishing tribes that frequented the islands. This was found to be insufficient basis for territorial title because the sultan did not exercise sovereignty over the particular disputed islands. 49 The are not constitutive of territorial title. In contrast, in Malaysia/Singapore, the tribunal recognized the ancient title of the Sultan of Johore based on evidence of the latter's acts of sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh and Middle Rocks and on the recognition accorded to the sultan by the maritime powers in the region. 60 The acts of sovereignty performed by the Sultan consisted of protesting Netherland's seizure of junks on the disputed islands and ceding the islands to Great Britain.
Thus, at the minimum, claims to historic title must be supported by evidence that the original title holder was a central authority who exercised territorial sovereignty over the particular disputed territory. Set against this minimum standard, China's evidence would indicate a geographical awareness of, but not the actual exercise of, sovereignty over the particular disputed islands.
61 Nonetheless, such geographical awareness casts a cloud over Japan's claim to title based on discovery and occupation terra nullius in 1894. Moreover, China's evidence indicates the existence of a claim by another sovereign state at the time when Japan allegedly consolidated title to the islands through continued control up to World War II. Thus, on the balance, the Maps also are a weak basis of territorial claims. They are not a source of title unless annexed to an agreement 63 or recognized as the authoritative interpretation of a boundary agreement. 64 At best, they are corroborative evidence of title already existing on another basis, 65 provided they meet the criteria of neutrality and certainty of provenance. 66 The only map of value to the resolution of the dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands is the one annexed to the Shimonoseki Treaty. Under Article 2, China ceded to Japan '(b) [t] he Island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa'. 67 Under Article 3, '[the] alignment of the frontiers' of Formosa and its appurtenant islands were supposed to be verified and demarcated according to 'the annexed map'. 68 This annexed map would definitively establish whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are among the islands appurtenant to Formosa that were ceded under the treaty. However, according to Sir Edward Hertslet, no map was published with the treaty, 69 and Article 3 was subsequently suppressed by Article 1 of the 1895 Convention for the Retrocession by Japan to China of the Southern Portion of the Province of Fengtien. 70 In sum, this section has shown that the focus on whether China or Japan has the longer historic title or older map is misplaced. The evidence relied upon by China and Japan does not establish in a convincing manner the existence of historic title. As discussed in the next section, the alternative approach applied in this article is based on the status quo post bellum.
B Status Quo Post Bellum
Eritrea v. Yemen, the status quo of indeterminacy agreed upon by the parties to the Treaty of Lausanne at the end of World War I precluded reversion to Yemen's ancient title over the disputed islands in the Red Sea. 72 Moreover, like China, which did not consent to the Peace Treaty, Yemen did not consent to the Treaty of Lausanne, yet it was bound by the status quo created by the treaty -its lack of consent was immaterial for it held no interest in the islands at that time. 73 Based on their own arguments, China and Japan have accepted that the territorial status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands at the end of the war would determine whether these reverted to China's historic title or remained in Japan's possession. To recall, the premise of China's claim is that the islands belong to the third category of stolen territory, and so reverted to its possession because of historic title, 74 whereas for Japan, they belong to the second category of territory which the Allied powers decided to maintain under Japanese sovereignty. 75 The status quo of the islands after the war is decisive.
Nature of Status Quo Post Bellum
The status quo post bellum is 'the status which exists at the time of cessation of hostilities [and which] becomes silently recognized through such cessation … [as] … the basis of the future relations of the parties'. 76 It has been equated to uti posseditis juris, 77 which is a view that, at the end of the wars of independence from colonialism, the existing administrative boundaries of the former colonies are retrospectively invested with the force of international boundaries. 78 The presumption that disputants will recognize the status quo as the reference point for their future relations arises from the reality that, according to Emer de Vattel:
[e]ach of the belligerent powers maintains that he has justice on his side -and as their pretensions are not liable to be judged by others -whatever state things happen to be in at the time of the treaty (of peace) is to be considered as their legitimate states; and if the parties intend to make any change in it, they must expressly specify it in the treaty. 79 Coleman Philippson adds that the presumption is for the convenience of third states for whom a contrary rule would be 'fraught with greater difficulties'. 80 If there are unresolved claims, their resolution should be sought within a reasonable period from the cessation of hostilities.
81
It could be argued that a limitation of the status quo post bellum is that its main element is acquiescence. 82 Acquiescence consists of refraining from the positive act of objecting to a prevailing status despite having a right and being impelled by the occasion to so object. 83 In Eritrea v. Yemen and in Malaysia/Singapore, title was awarded based on a 'general opinion' 84 and on a 'convergent evolution of … positions … regarding title', 85 respectively, as reinforced by the positive acts of the parties. 86 These were not matters of acquisitive prescription contra legem, for there were no subsisting prior titles involved. 87 Similarly, in Cambodia v. Thailand, the award in favour of Cambodia was based on Thailand's acquiescence when it failed to protest an official map that ascribed the disputed territory to Cambodia. 88 Acquiescence was reinforced by Thailand's positive acts confirming that the map was an official interpretation of their boundary treaty. 89 Accordingly, while the focus of the fourth part of this article is on the status quo of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it will also determine whether the conduct of the parties after 1945-1952 contradict or confirm the status quo. It is said that restoration of the territorial situation before the hostilities (status quo ante bellum) or as it ought to be (status quo de jure) is the more just arrangement. 90 However, jurists like Lassa Oppenheim note that there is more extensive state practice in status quo post bellum.
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For the purpose of this article, it is more important that, as will be shown presently, China, Japan and the Allied powers purposely outlined the status quo in the East China Sea to guide them in the future disposition of the islands. 81 
General Practice
China invoked the concept of status quo against Japan during the negotiations for armistice and peace in 1895. 92 Japan had demanded as a precondition to armistice that its troops be allowed to occupy Taku, Tientsin and Shau-hai-kuan. 93 It had also demanded that the Shimonoseki Treaty provide for the cession of Formosa. 94 China objected that such demands are not sustained by international practice because Japan's 'armies have not yet reached Taku, Tientsin or Shan-hai-kuan'. 95 In regard to Formosa, China again interposed the status quo against Japan's demand for cession: H.E. Li: Japan is taking an entirely new departure. No Western nation has ever demanded whatever territory it was able to occupy, and by doing so you will incur the disapproval of Western Powers. 96 For China, Japan was not in the position to demand the cession of Formosa as 'no Japanese soldier ha[d] as yet set foot' on the island. 97 However, if only to spare Formosa from the ravages of an invasion, China was forced to agree to the occupation of the island by Japan as the pre-arranged reference point of the terms of cession under the Shimonoseki Treaty. 98 A more contemporary conduct also involved Formosa after World War II. The ROC had pressed the Allied powers for a common understanding that if Formosa was liberated by an Allied force, the liberating forces should allow the ROC to position itself as the occupant of the island. 99 Accordingly, the USA directed its forces to turn over the island to the ROC if and when Japan surrendered it. 100 By 1945, the reality was that the ROC hardly could control the liberated areas in the China theatre. 101 The USA physically transported the ROC's troops to Formosa, 102 thereby contriving a starting point of future international relations in which the island was under the occupation of the ROC rather than the PRC or any other power. 103 The PRC was prevented from manoeuvring into a position of relative control of Formosa prior to the San Francisco Peace Conference. 104 Thus, with respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China, Japan and the Allied powers subscribed to the status quo post bellum, as the discussion below will show.
Particular Practice
In 1942, the Chinese public had urged their government to ensure 'the restoration of Formosa … [and] … the Ryu Kyu Islands'. 105 This prompted the USA to inquire about China's post-war plans. 106 The director of the Eastern Asiatic Affairs Department of China downplayed the 'exaggerated statements by private individuals concerning war aims' involving the Ryukyu Islands. He clarified that 'the truth of the matter was that … the Liuchius (Ryukyu Islands) … which had only been tributary to China, had been entirely separated from it for almost eighty years … and that they were now in effect an integral part of Japan'. 107 However, Chinese Foreign Minister V.T. Soong announced that China would recover the Ryukyu Islands after the war. 108 Soong inquired with the USA and Great Britain regarding their understanding of the post-war territorial situation. 109 The USA expressed the understanding that 'the views of the Chinese, the British and the US Governments were very much in accord … that the Japanese people must be restricted to their own main islands … [and] that Formosa must be returned to China'. 110 At the Cairo Conference, one of the questions involved 'the arrangements to be made for Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan and the recapture of Chinese territory'. 111 China's position was that Formosa should be returned to it 112 and that Japanese territory should be administered by the army of occupation. 113 On the question of the Ryukyu Islands, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt 'inquired more than once whether China would want Ryukyu'. 114 Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek 'replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the US and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization'. 115 China reiterated its position in a memorandum seeking the retrocession of Formosa 116 and the establishment of a Joint Council that would control Japan's territory, including the Ryukyus. 117 The final text of the Cairo Declaration confined itself to the disposition of Formosa and omitted reference to Japanese territory. Nonetheless, the exchange of views preceding it clearly indicates the intention to outline the status quo in the East China Sea.
In 1944, China reiterated its proposal for joint occupation of Japanese territory.
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It sought an understanding with the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) that upon liberation of Formosa China would immediately administer the islands and that upon occupation of Japan China would be involved in the territory's administration by the occupying force. 119 The USA proposed that, consistent with the Cairo Declaration, Formosa should be administered by China, but the four main islands (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku) and 'such adjacent minor islands as they determine' shall remain under Japanese residual sovereignty, 120 with the understanding that the Ryukyu Islands are 'minor islands'. 121 The final text of the Potsdam Declaration adopted the US proposal, 122 and China signed it. 123 Thereafter, consistent with the desired status quo, Formosa was occupied by the ROC, upon the surrender of Japan,
The Status Quo Post Bellum in Relation to the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands: 1945-1952
The primary records of the conduct of China, Japan and the Allied powers in 1945-1952 were examined to ascertain the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Consensus on the following points was relevant: (i) whether the islands were part of Formosa or part of the Ryukyus or Nansei Shoto; (ii) whether the islands remained subject to Japan's interest and (iii) whether the islands were claimed by Japan alone or also by China. These points provide the structural organization of this discussion, and the consensus will be assessed against the conduct of the parties before the critical date.
A Identity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
This section shows that China, Japan and the Allied powers understood that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were part of the Ryukyu Islands/Nansei Shoto rather than of Formosa. This is based on two main findings: (i) China's occupation of Formosa did not extend to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, whereas the US military and civilian governments for the Ryukyu Islands extended their jurisdiction to the islands and (ii) Japan purposely caused the insertion of the phrase 'Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude' in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, thereby ensuring that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were placed under its residual sovereignty.
Occupation of Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands
To recall the discussion in the third part of this article, it was agreed that pursuant to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration Formosa would be occupied by the ROC, and the minor islands, including the Ryukyus, would be occupied by the USA. To determine consensus on whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were part of Formosa or part of the Ryukyus, the extent of China's acts of occupation of Formosa and the USA's occupation of the Ryukyus were determined.
Upon taking over Formosa and other liberated areas in the Chinese theatre, the ROC, as the existing government of China, 126 adopted a constitution in 1946. 127 Article 4 of this constitution defines the national territory as the 'territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries'. 128 China had had several constitutions 129 where the national territory was described simply as 'the dominion heretofore existing ' (1913) 136 provide a more precise limitation of the national territory. The 1934 Constitution, which immediately precedes the 1946 Constitution, provides a detailed description of the national territory:
Art. 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists of areas originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechwan, Hsikang, Hopie, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Fukien, Kwantung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ninghsia, Singkiang, Mongolia and Tibet. 137 If the foregoing provision of the 1934 Constitution would be considered the basis of the clause 'existing national boundaries' in Article 4 of the 1946 Constitution, then it would be difficult to imagine the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as being integral to China.
While the 1946 Constitution is vague on the extent of the national territory, the Chinese Year Book, 1944 Book, -1945 issued by the Council of International Affairs of the ROC, includes Formosa in the territory of China and situates it 'somewhere between 22° N. and 25° N.,' 139 with the Ryukyu Islands situated 'less than 150 miles to the north'. 140 As described, Formosa does not include the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are situated at '25°45' N., 123°E ... about 80 miles northward of Sakishima Gunto'. 141 On the other hand, even before the surrender of Japan, the USA had established military control of 'Nansei Shoto and adjacent waters'. 142 After the surrender of Japan, the Imperial Japanese government continued to administer Japan proper, consisting of the four main islands and: However, the military government for the Ryukyus remained in control of 'Nansei Shoto and adjacent waters south of 30° North Latitude'. 145 In 1950, the military government for the Ryukyu Islands was replaced by the US Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). 146 The boundaries of the 'area of political and geographical jurisdiction' of the USCAR were defined in Ordinance no. 68. 147 The boundaries were reiterated in USCAR Proclamation no. 27. 148 The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were found within these limits. There is no record of objection by China to the USA's extension of its jurisdiction to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islandsnot even as incidental to China's complaints against the USA's military invasion of Formosa. 149 Other Allied powers did not object. 150 Instead, it appears that China (ROC) entered into relations with the US military government for the Ryukyus in the form of the purchase of scrap metal under the China Bulk Sale Agreement 151 and the training of health workers. 152 In sum, based on the foregoing records, it can be stated that China did not regard its occupation of Formosa to extend to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, while the USA regarded its occupation of the Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude to extend to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Nansei Shoto South of 29 Degrees North Latitude
From 1946 to 1951, various drafts of the Peace Treaty were produced, 153 but only the following drafts benefited from the comments of various states, including the ROC: (i) the provisional US draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty, dated 23 March 1951 (provisional draft); 154 (ii) the US-UK Draft Peace Treaty, dated 3 May 1951 (joint draft) 155 and (iii) the text of the proposed treaty, dated 13 August 1951 (final draft). 156 The provisional draft and the joint draft provided for administration by the USA of the 'Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude'. 157 A copy of the provisional draft was received by the ROC 158 as a member of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), 159 while a copy of the provisional draft was informally given by the UK to the PRC. 160 The ROC commented on the provisional draft 161 and the joint draft 162 but did not refer to the provision on the Ryukyu Islands. 163 The PRC commented that, under the joint draft, US 'trusteeship over the Ryukyu Islands' is virtually a 'continued occupation of these islands, whose separation from Japan has never been provided for in any previous international agreement'. 164 The joint draft had undergone several revisions, 165 one important revision being the substitution of the geographical description 'Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude' with 'Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude'. 166 This substitution was sought by Japan purposely to include other islands not encompassed by the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degree north latitude: TOPAD 123. For Dulles. Under date July 12 Jap Govt submitted fol 'observations' on July 3 draft treaty: Begin text: 1. Art. 3 Your attention is requested to (a) of our observations dated 3 April 1951. While 'Nansei Islands' includes all islands south of 29 degrees north latitude, 'Ryukyu Islands' do not. 167 Indeed, as early as 3 April 1951, in its comment to the provisional draft, Japan sought the substitution of the term 'Ryukyu Islands' with 'Nansei Shoto': of the Sakishima Gunto. 177 The islands are part of Nansei Shoto. 178 This last point was confirmed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which, in its memorandum on the future disposition of the Nansei Shoto, specifically stated that the 'Nansei Shoto, to include ... Sento Shosho [Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands]' were strategic areas that must be placed under the exclusive control of the USA. 180 in the interest of clarity, it adopted the Japanese proposal and revised Article 3 of the joint draft by deleting 'Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude and substitute[ing] Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude'. 181 A copy of the revised joint draft dated 20 July 1951 was received by the ROC. 182 The ROC did not object to this draft; instead, it informed the USA that its bilateral peace treaty with Japan would be of the same tenor. 183 As noted earlier, the PRC objected to the separation of the Ryukyu Islands from Japan. 184 The final draft, which was voted upon at the San Francisco Peace Conference, used the geographical description 'Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude'. 185 No delegate at the conference questioned the scope of this geographical description. 186 Hence, based on its conduct, Japan sought to place all of the Nansei Islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, south of 29 degrees north latitude, within the area under its residual sovereignty. The foregoing discussion indicates a consensus that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were part of the Nansei Shoto/Ryukyu Islands under the American administration and not part of Formosa under Chinese occupation. The next subsection focuses on whether it was further agreed that the islands would remain subject to Japan's interest.
elements of the concept of residual sovereignty. First, the USA would not acquire sovereignty over the islands, for such action would be in contravention of its national policy and the United Nations (UN) Declaration. However, with the consent of Japan, the USA would exercise administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory while awaiting affirmative UN action on the matter of trusteeship. 196 Second, such exclusive control of the islands by the USA would be effective only for 'so long as Japan is sovereign'. 197 If Japan were made to renounce sovereignty over the islands in favour of no one, there would be insurmountable legal difficulty to the retention by the USA of control of the islands precisely because the 'victors in the war [on] Japan, including the USSR, have an inchoate right to sovereignty of these islands'. 198 The rights to the islands that Japan had granted to the USA will be impaired for Japan as the grantor would itself be without any title.
199
The foregoing basic principle regarding Japan's territory was set out in a joint memorandum by the US State Department and the Defence Department, which was approved by the US president and circulated to the FEC members, including the ROC. 200 The ROC informed Dulles that it was in accord with '[US] trusteeship of the Ryukyu'. 201 Moreover, around this time (1950) (1951) , the PRC had filed with the UN Security Council complaints against the US for encroaching into its territory. 202 Its complaints did not refer to the US presence in the Ryukyu Islands or the retention of sovereignty by Japan over the islands. In sum, there was consensus that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as part of the second category of minor islands, remained under Japan's residual sovereignty. The question addressed below is whether there were other claimants to the islands.
C Absence of Other Claimants to the Islands
It was cited earlier that China vacillated on its claims to the Ryukyu Islands. 203 In 1948, the Legislative Yuan of the ROC passed Resolution no. 196 calling for the return of the Ryukyus (Nansei Shoto) to China. 204 However, the USA dismissed the call as a mere 'sign of lively apprehension among many Chinese that the US may be engaged in restoring Japan's military potential'. 205 Despite the 1948 resolution of the Legislative Yuan, the ROC did not formalize a claim to the islands. Instead, it expressed its accord to Japan's residual sovereignty. 206 More importantly, its separate peace treaty with Japan referred to territories to which it had pending claims, 207 such as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, but not to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or Nansei Shoto. 208 On the part of the PRC, it had complained against the impairment of its territorial sovereignty over Formosa. 209 Its complaints did not extend to the USA's presence in, or Japanese retention of sovereignty over, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. What might be considered a challenge to the residual sovereignty of Japan came within the US government itself, specifically the JCS and the SCAP. The JCS saw the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands as a strategic area that must be placed under the exclusive control of the USA. 210 The SCAP believed that Japan should cede the islands to the USA 211 for it was 'intolerable ... for the US to spend hundreds of millions of dollars transforming Okinawa only to give the islands up'. 212 Among the Allied powers, Canada and New Zealand favoured the cession of the islands to the USA. 213 For Japan, US trusteeship was acceptable provided 'these islands ... [are] returned to Japan as soon as the need of trusteeship disappears'. 214 It is important to emphasize that Japan made a 'plea ... that [its] sovereignty should not be renounced'. 215 For the former Soviet Union, US trusteeship over the Nansei Shoto was in violation of the Potsdam Declaration for the islands should remain under Japanese sovereignty. 216 India suggested that the return of the islands to Japan be resolved at the peace conference rather than left to the discretion of the USA. 217 The UK also favoured a US trusteeship, 218 provided that the Peace Treaty expressly adopt such an arrangement. 219 Australia, France and the Philippines also favoured trusteeship. 220 These views of the Allied powers presupposed that there was no claimant to the islands other than Japan.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that in the period 1945-1952 there was a general agreement that the islands were not subject to any territorial claim other than that of Japan. China had initially entertained a claim to the islands but did not pursue it. The more serious claim came from within the US Defense Department. At this point, it is important to turn to the question of China's lack of consent to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty -that is, the disposition of Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude. To recall, in Eritrea v. Yemen, the disposition of the Red Sea islands by virtue of the Lausanne Treaty was opposed by Yemen on the ground that it did not consent to the treaty. 221 Thus, Yemen's situation could be likened to that of China in regard to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. Moreover, like China, Yemen immediately protested the Lausanne Treaty as res inter alio acta. 222 However, these factors did not prevent the status of the Red Sea islands under the Lausanne Treaty from binding Yemen. The tribunal held:
The Imam was not a party to the Treaty of Lausanne and in that technical sense the Treaty was res inter alios acta as to Yemen. If title had lain with Yemen at that time, the parties of the Treaty of Lausanne could not have transferred title elsewhere without the consent of Yemen. But, as indicated above, title still remained with Turkey. Boundary and territorial treaties made between two parties are res inter alios acta vis-à-vis third parties. But this special category of treaties also represents a legal reality which necessarily impinges upon third states, because they have effect erga omnes. If State A has title to territory and passes it to State B, then it is legally without purpose for State C to invoke the principle of res inter alios acta, unless its title is better than that of A (rather than of B). In the absence of such better title, a claim of res inter alios acta is without legal import. 223 Similarly, as it was shown that China had no claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands at the time of the adoption of the Peace Treaty, its consent was not sine qua non to the validity of Article 3 on the disposition of the islands. In fact, when the ROC entered into a separate peace treaty with Japan, it did not see fit to refer to Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude, whereas it made express provision for the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. 224 To summarize the fourth part of this article, there was consensus that the islands belonged to the second category of minor islands whose fate was to be decided by the Allied powers; that the islands remained under the residual sovereignty of Japan and that the islands were not being claimed by China. To recall, the alternative approach applied in this article not only focuses on the status quo but also considers the conduct of the parties proximate to 1945-1952, as these might contradict or confirm the status quo. It was stated in the third part of this article that the evidence of China and Japan failed to establish in a convincing manner the existence of a prior title. In the following section, it is ascertained whether the conduct of the parties after 1952 and before 1970 contradicts or confirms the status quo.
D Subsequent Conduct of the Parties (1952-1970)
To be clear, the term 'conduct of the parties' in this part of the article does not mean effectivites or the continued display of authority. 225 To resolve territorial disputes based on effectivites, it must be shown that there was an actual exercise of authority with the intention and will to act as sovereign. 226 Moreover, it must be shown that the effectivites are not challenged by another sovereign 227 and that they are not contra legemthat is, contrary to an existing title based on treaty, 228 unless the holder of the prior existing title acquiesced to such effectivites. 229 In regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, from 1952 up to the reversion of the islands in 1972, the USA alone exercised exclusive control under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. 230 China does not dispute this fact. 231 As for the period before the war, Japan was in possession, but any effectivites it may have accumulated were superseded by its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instruments of Surrender, and the Peace Treaty, which left the fate of the islands to the will of the Allied powers. 232 Indeed, when it signed the Instruments of Surrender, Japan expressly agreed to carry out the territorial provisions in these instruments 'as required by the SCAP'. 234 Second, as the signing of the Reversion Treaty drew near, the ROC government pressed the USA to keep the final status of the islands open 235 for it regarded the issue as 'a measure of the [it's] ability to protect itself '. 236 When the
